This paper considers the optimal two-part pricing strategy of a monopolist whose customers collude when they purchase the firm's product. In contrast to the sentiment in the existing price discrimination literature, I find that a monopolist's profit can actually increase when consumers share its good. When transaction costs for collusion are zero the firm can extract the full consumer surplus through two-part prices. When transaction costs are positive or there are a substantial number of consumers without access to resale, the firm may be hurt by arbitrage.
Introduction
A standard assumption for models of price discrimination is that consumers are unable to engage in side transactions after they have purchased a firm's product. This assumption generally helps the firm screen its customers on the basis of their observed or unobserved characteristics. Restrictions on arbitrage are appropriate for many markets.' In Walter Oi's (1971) classic example of separate amusement park admission and ride prices, it is hard to imagine a situation in which many consumers can use tickets for rides when only one person is admitted to the park. But surely it is possible for two households to consider buying a lawnmower or theater subscription jointly to avoid the expense of each purchasing independently. Since Oi dissected the "Disneyland dilemma," it has been suggested (but never proven) that such cooperation among consumers would diminish the monopolist's ability to win high profit through nonlinear prices. Oi writes:
A two-part tariff wherein the monopolist exacts a lump sum tax for the right to buy his product can surely increase profits. Yet, this type of pricing is rarely observed. That apparent oversight on the part of the greedy monopolist can partially be explained by the inability to prevent resale. If transaction costs were low, one customer could pay the lump sum tax and purchase large quantities for resale to other consumers. (1971, p.
88)2
Similar arguments are presented in Phlips (1983) , Tirole (1988) , and Wilson (1993) .
In this paper I investigate firm profit and social welfare when consumers can engage in side transactions. A simple model is used to demonstrate that there are situations in which the price schedule. Any consumer (or group of consumers) that is present in the market is then able to approach the firm and purchase at the posted prices. The firm cannot revise its price schedule between when prices are first announced and when all eligible consumers have had the opportunity to purchase.
All 
Part (ii) of AO implies that the demand curves do not cross and part (iv) ensures that the firm's
profit maximization problem is concave in p for all of the selling strategies discussed below.3 For convenience, define Si as the surplus to a consumer of type i from purchasing the efficient quantity at a price p = c, i.e., Si = c Di(p) dp. If a consumer does not purchase from the monopolist, she receives zero surplus. A single pair of consumers called "consumer 1" and "consumer 2" have the ability to purchase cooperatively. Consumers 1 and 2 belong to the low-and high-demand groups, respectively. This pair of potential buyers pays a nonnegative transaction cost, T, if 1 and 2 cooperate to avoid paying a fixed fee, F, once.4 The negotiation process between the consumers regarding the payment of positive transaction costs is not explicitly modeled. I assume that consumers only incur the transaction cost if they are able to reach an agreement that increases their joint welfare (measured through consumer surplus) and makes neither consumer worse off. Once a welfare-improving agreement is identified, the consumers are able to buy from the firm and share the purchased good (and its expense) in a way that does not disturb the agreement.
Although both the firm and the consumers would bear some expense to change T in certain situations described below, I assume that T is determined exogenously throughout this analysis.
Following the terminology of Oi (1971) quoted in the introduction of this paper, side transactions between consumers are sometimes referred to as "resale" of the firm's product. Social welfare is measured without regard for its distribution among the consumers and the monopolist, that is, welfare is simply the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and firm profit. All comparisons of levels of welfare made in this paper are between two-part pricing schemes with and without resale. Transaction costs are considered to be equivalent to deadweight loss, as T is described as paid out of consumer surplus.
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The above assumptions concerning the composition of the consumer population are certainly quite restrictive. One can imagine that a more general model with, say, uncertainty over the demand intensities of consumer coalition members would better represent the decision problem of the firm. Despite this, the results discussed below include a wide range of outcomes.
When Arbitrage Is Prohibited
The purpose of this section is to review the firm's problem when arbitrage among consumers is prohibited. Profit maximization leads the firm to choose between two strategies: selling to all consumers (low and high demand) and selling only to consumers with the demand curve in profit. The intuition behind why the firm sets p* above c is rather simple. Suppose the monopolist implemented a pricing policy in which p = c and F = S,. A small increase in p would lead to a second-order decrease in profit from the low-demand consumers, but the firm would enjoy a first-order increase in profit (through unit sales) from high-demand consumers. When the firm serves both high-and low-demand consumers in the model without arbitrage, it leaves a positive surplus for consumer 2 and there is deadweight loss. At this point it is convenient to define a few terms that will be useful in the next section of this paper. Let A represent the surplus of a high-demand consumer in the standard model. I can write A = D2(p) dp -D,(p) dp.
Because the firm charges consumers a unit price above marginal cost, deadweight losses arise from sales to each consumer. Let B be the lost surplus under Dl and let C be the loss under D2. Exact expressions for the deadweight losses (per consumer) are: B = D,(p) dp -(p* -c)D,(p*) and C = D2(p) dp -(p* -c)D(p*). 
Variation in Transaction Costs
In this section I consider the ability of the monopolist to extract surplus from consumers 1 and 2 as T varies. The analysis is split into two cases: when the firm would sell to high-and low-demand consumers when resale is prohibited, and when the firm would only sell to the high-demand consumers. The following assumption holds throughout this section: ASSUMPTION 1 (Al): N = 0 and T e [0, oo).
Al imposes a serious limitation on the population of the market, but it is used to isolate the analysis on variability in transaction costs.
When the Firm Would Serve Both Consumers without Resale
The central additional assumption of this subsection is that consumer 1 has sufficiently strong demand to lead the firm to serve both consumers in the standard model. To this end, I state: ASSUMPTION 2 (A2): I* > S2.
The analysis that follows from assumptions AO, Al, and A2 is perhaps easiest to digest if it is divided into exhaustive cases for values of T.
Case 1: T = 0 When consumers 1 and 2 participate in costless arbitrage, a profit-maximizing monopolist takes the market to an efficient outcome. If the firm sets the unit price, p, equal to marginal cost, it can charge a tariff of S, + S2. Both the monopolist and the consumers know that when T = 0, the firm will not receive payment of the lump sum tariff, F, more than once. A firm aware of this situation finds the tariff that, when paid only once, maximizes profit while keeping both consumers in the market. The rational monopolist knows that the consumers will cooperate if they have the opportunity to share positive surplus from the monopolist's product. When the only purchasing option available to the consumers is a unit price of c and a tariff that extracts (almost) their entire joint surplus, the consumers purchase D (c) + D2(c) of the firm's product and the firm will collect (almost) S, + S2 in profit.
The complete removal of resale costs allows the unit price to equal marginal cost, and there is no deadweight loss. When arbitrage costs among consumers are interpreted as Coasian transaction costs, this result is not surprising. Coase (1960) predicts that well-defined property rights and negligible transaction costs allow economic agents to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. What may be surprising about this result is that I have removed a restriction on consumer behavior, but the firm is able to respond in a way that leaves the consumers worse off.5 The expansion of a consumer's choice set is usually associated with an increase in her welfare.
Case 2: T > F* Because this case is fairly simple, I consider it before turning to the more difficult situation in which T takes values between 0 and F*. The firm's choice of a pricing scheme depends on whether it is advantageous to permit (or induce) resale between consumers 1 and 2. If the monopolist allows its customers to engage in postsale arbitrage when transaction costs are high, the tariff F must satisfy S, + S2 -T -F. That is, a pricing scheme that results in purchase and resale cannot include a tariff that gives the consumers a negative joint surplus. When F satisfies the condition F = S, + S2 -T and p = c, all consumer surplus is accounted for and the firm cannot increase profit while ensuring arbitrage. The monopolist's profit is fI = F.
Depending on demand conditions and the realized value of T, the firm can sometimes collect strictly more profit than HI within Case 2. Recall from section 3 that the profit collected by a monopolist in a model with N = 0 and no arbitrage is II* = S + S2 -W. I have made 5 Or at least consumer 2 is worse off. In the standard two-part pricing model without arbitrage, the low-demand consumer will not enjoy anything greater than an arbitrarily small amount of surplus. The high-demand consumer collects positive surplus in the standard model; here, she is left with (essentially) zero surplus. no assumptions that ensure that W is always greater or less than F*. If W > F*, the firm prefers If to II* provided W > T. The firm is able to implement the pricing policy designed to return II because the fixed fee charged for this policy, F, is only paid once and it leaves the consumers with nonnegative joint surplus. The other possibility for the situation W > F* is that T > W. When transaction costs are weakly greater than W, the firm prefers fT* to II. I can be sure that the firm is able to collect H* because consumers' savings from avoiding the lump-sum charge more than once (F*) are less than the cost of doing so (T) by assumption. In summary, when W > F* within Case 2 the firm is at least as well off with the possibility of resale among consumers as it was without this possibility. Now consider the situation F* ' W while T > F*. Because transaction costs are greater than W, n1* must be larger than the profit from any pricing scheme that relies on resale and leaves consumers with nonnegative joint surplus. Arbitrage cannot prevent the implementation of the two-part price schedule that returns nI*. Again, the consumers could avoid paying F* twice through joint purchase, but the expense of this action is larger than the benefit.
Case 3: 0 < T F*
The main implication of the assumption maintained throughout Case 3, 0 < T -F*, is that resale among consumers is inexpensive enough to prevent the firm from collecting F* from each consumer. As in Case 2, the firm's preferred pricing strategy (and its profitability) depend crucially on the relative sizes of W and F*. I begin Case 3 by looking at the situation in which W > F* (-T). If the firm sets p = c and F = SI + S2 -T, it collects more profit than if resale among consumers is prohibited and the firm receives nl*. As the fixed fee F is constructed to leave the consumers with nonnegative joint surplus, the firm is able to implement its pricing strategy because the only options for the consumers are zero/negligible surplus from joint purchase and zero surplus from not purchasing at all. Thus when W > F* in Case 3 the firm strictly benefits from the possibility of consumer resale. Now suppose that W < F*. I begin by considering situations in which at least one of the constraints W -F* and T < F* binds. If W = F* = T the firm is indifferent between: (i) posting p* and F*, and (ii) setting p = c and F = F. Consumers are also indifferent between the strategies: (i) each pay F*, and (ii) pay F* once and incur T to avoid an additional payment of F*. The firm is able to implement a pricing strategy that yields exactly as much profit as its optimal strategy when resale is prohibited by assumption. If T < W = F* the firm cannot set a fixed fee as high as F* and observe payment of it more than once, but in this situation the firm would not attempt to collect a fixed fee from each consumer. With T < W the firm prefers to set F = S + S2 -T and induce resale, yielding profit that is greater than II*. The firm benefits from the possibility of resale among consumers. When W < F* = T, the firm prefers that consumers purchase separately. The monopolist is able to implement the same pricing scheme as when resale is prohibited by assumption because consumers are indifferent between each paying F* and incurring the expense of purchasing jointly from the firm.
If W < T < F* the firm cannot collect as much profit as when arbitrage is assumed away. A profit-maximizing pricing strategy that induces resale between the consumers includes a fixed fee that is less than II* because T is larger than W. A strategy that leads to the consumers purchasing separately cannot yield profit as high as I* because the lump-sum charges that are part of it must be less than F*. Thus the firm is adversely affected by resale when W < T < F*. If W = T < F* the firm is unable to implement a pricing strategy that results in separate purchase and yields profit as high as fI*, but when the firm induces arbitrage it can set a fixed fee of I*. In this situation the firm is just as well off when resale is possible as when it is prohibited by assumption. Finally, consider the situation 0 < T < W. Although the firm cannot implement a pricing strategy that leads each consumer to purchase separately and pay a fixed fee as large as F*, the firm can do better than II by inducing resale. An optimally sized fixed fee of S, + S2 -T along with p = c leads to firm profit greater than I*.
The results on profit from the three cases analyzed above are summarized in the following proposition: PROPOSITION 1. Under assumptions AO-A2 a monopolist's profit can increase, decrease, or remain the same when a prohibition of side transactions between consumers is removed.
Changes in profit depend on:
1. The transaction cost of arbitrage between consumers, and 2. The relative sizes of F* and W, where F* is the optimal fixed fee charged by the firm when resale is prohibited and W is the amount of surplus collected by the high-demand consumer plus deadweight loss when resale is prohibited.
When transaction costs are equal to zero, the firm is able to extract all surplus from the consumers by offering its product with a fixed fee that is as large as the summed surplus of the two consumers at the efficient level of consumption.
If demand conditions imply W > F*, profit is monotone in transaction costs. Whenever the firm's best pricing strategy is to encourage resale, profit is at least as high as in the standard model and is strictly decreasing in T. Whenever the firm chooses a fixed fee that will be paid by both consumers, it can charge F* (to collect I*). However, if F* > W, there are levels of transaction costs that lead to profit lower than II*. Because profit is greater than II* when T is small and profit is equal to II* for sufficiently large values of T, the possibility of transaction costs that drive profit below II* implies that the monopolist's returns are not monotone in T when F* > W. Unlike profit, welfare is never monotone in transaction costs. When T is small enough to lead a monopolist to induce resale by consumers, the firm is the only party in the market that collects surplus. Profit and social welfare decrease as T increases and arbitrage occurs. But when transaction costs become high enough for the firm to switch its pricing strategy from one that encourages arbitrage to one that prevents it, welfare increases abruptly. Consumer 2, the high-demand individual, receives positive (and nonnegligible) surplus. If demand conditions are such that the firm must set a fixed fee less than F* while discouraging resale, welfare continues to rise as T increases. This further increase in welfare occurs as the firm reduces its unit price toward p*. to set the unit price equal to marginal cost and the lump-sum fee equal to S2. For the remainder of this subsection I assume that AO, Al, and A3 hold. Unlike the analysis in the previous subsection, the implications of A3 are rather straightforward. If transaction costs between consumers are zero, the firm can offer a two-part price schedule of p = c and F = SI + S2. Whereas the prohibition of resale leads to consumer 1 being "priced out" of the market because of weak demand, when arbitrage is permitted each consumer that is willing to compensate the firm for production costs is able to do so. The selected pricing scheme extracts all surplus from the consumers at the efficient level of production. Again, two-part pricing under costless resale resembles first-degree price discrimination.
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As the cost of resale increases, the firm continues to offer a unit of price of c but the fixed fee is adjusted to SI + S2 -T. As long as T is no larger than S,, profit is higher than in the standard model. Reduction of the fixed fee continues until T exceeds S,, at which point the firm elects to set F = S2 and only the high-demand consumer is served. 
PROPOSITION 4. Under assumptions AO, Al, and A3 social welfare is weakly higher when a prohibition of arbitrage between consumers is removed. Specifically, welfare is strictly higher when T E [0, S,) and welfare is unchanged when T E [S,, oc).
As all consumers receive zero surplus under the assumptions of this subsection, I offer a corollary to Proposition 4 that is very similar to Corollary 3. The remainder of this section is divided into three parts. In the first I characterize the different pricing strategies that might be used by a monopolist under AO and A4. The next subsection considers the profit and welfare implications of resale when low-demand consumers would be served in the standard model. I then present results on profit and welfare under AO, A4, and the assumption that low-demand consumers would not be served when side transactions are prohibited. As in section 4, I find that the effects of resale on profit and welfare depend on whether the firm would have served the low-demand consumers without arbitrage.
COROLLARY 4. Welfare is monotonically decreasing in T when AO, Al, and A3 hold. Welfare is strictly decreasing for T E [0, S,) and it is constant for T E [S,, o).
Heterogeneity in Resale Opportunities
Possible Pricing Strategies under Heterogeneity in Resale Opportunities
As above, the firm is limited to setting one unit price and one fixed fee. There are three general strategies that the firm can use to serve (portions of) the consumer population: (i) Only sell to consumers 1 and 2; (ii) sell to consumers 1, 2, and the N independent high-demand consumers; and (iii) sell to all (2N + 2) consumers. Each of these strategies has a different pair of optimal prices. I denote these prices pi and Fi, where i corresponds to the list number given above (e.g., P2 and F2 are set if the firm decides to serve consumers 1, 2, and the remaining N high-demand consumers). III, I2, and 13 are the corresponding amounts of profit.
If the firm only serves the consumers who are able to resell its product it sets p, = c and F, = SI + S2, as in section 4. Under this arrangement, profit is fI, = SI + S2. The second strategy that the firm might choose corresponds to a profit maximization problem of max (N + 1) f D2(p) dp
P2 .
P2
Note 
F2 is set equal to ;2 D2(p) dp. Although D, has a relatively small role in determining P2, its presence means that the surplus that would be retained by consumers 1 and 2 if the firm set P2 = c attracts a unit price above marginal cost. f2 is the value of the objective function in This price is used in F3 = Sp D1(p) dp, to determine the fixed fee for this marketing strategy. The monopolist collects profit equal to the objective function in Equation 4 evaluated at p3.
Although it is not necessarily easy to compare profit from the three marketing schemes described above, we establish a pair of useful lower bounds on I2 and 13. LEMMA 2. 12 is at least at large as (N + 1)S2 and 113 is at least as large as (2N + 1)SI. PROOF: If the monopolist was to set P2 and P3 equal to marginal cost, it would collect (N + 1)S2 and (2N + 1)S, in profit, respectively, from marketing strategies 2 and 3 described above. But if the firm sets P2 and P3 according to Equations 3 and 5, the resulting profit would be from (N + 1)S2 and (2N + 1)Si, respectively. QED.
The firm can simply compare the profit from each of these marketing strategies to decide which has the greatest return for the observed demand conditions. The firm will move among the strategies in a fairly reasonable way; this is reflected in the following lemma. The intuition behind the possibility of 1I being the largest or the smallest return was presented in Proposition 5 and Lemma 3, respectively. Perhaps the more interesting part of this proposition is that the firm's choice to serve both high-and low-demand consumers when resale is prohibited does not necessarily mean that the firm will always find n3 > f12. The reason behind this is something subtler than the fact that consumer 1 moves out of the population of low-demand consumers once resale is possible. The relative number of independent high-and low-demand consumers is the same as in the standard model. However, when the N low-demand consumers are brought into the market, the firm must reduce the amount of profit that it takes from the N independent high-demand consumers and consumers 1 and 2.
Just as profit can increase or decrease with the introduction of resale when all consumers would be served without arbitrage, the change in overall social welfare will not always have the same sign. The fact that profit is always higher with resale under the assumptions of this subsection leads directly to a welfare result. When side transactions between consumers are prohibited, the total amount of welfare in the market is the profit generated by sales to independent highdemand consumers. But social welfare is at least as high as profit. If resale between consumers 1 and 2 leads to higher profit then it must also lead to higher welfare. Although this welfare comparison is true for all N, welfare under resale jumps up when the monopolist switches from pursuing II to 12. When the firm sells to the N independent high-demand individuals, consumers 1 and 2 each receive a positive amount of surplus and social welfare strictly exceeds profit. This result is summarized (without proof) in the following proposition: PROPOSITION 9. Assume that the monopolist would not sell to low-demand consumers when arbitrage is prohibited: H* < S2. Under this assumption, AO, and A4, welfare is always higher when resale between consumers 1 and 2 is permitted.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that a monopolist can be made better off by the presence of postsale arbitrage among consumers. In the most extreme situation (when all consumers have access to costless resale), the increase in monopoly profit is accompanied by an efficient allocation of resources. However, there are situations in which the firm is adversely affected by resale. In the case of costly arbitrage between two consumers (section 4), it is possible to observe a range of transaction costs and demand conditions under which firm profit is lower. This result reinforces the conventional view that monopolists are hurt by arbitrage, but not as the literature suggests-where transaction costs are zero or very low. A consumer population that is mixed in its access to resale can also lead to lower profit.
The ability of the firm to increase profit is not driven by the assumption of two-part pricing. For example, if a firm sells discrete price/quantity bundles in a situation without resale between consumers with different demand intensities, it preserves a rent for the high-demand buyer. But when the same firm faces consumers with the ability to engage in costless resale, it will sell one large bundle that extracts (almost) all consumer surplus. The crucial assumption in this paper is that of arbitrage between consumers with different demand intensities. The firm is able to benefit from cooperation among buyers because resale allows the firm to capture the surplus otherwise received by a high-demand consumer. This interaction of heterogeneous buyers is not troubling if I believe that a consumer's likely purchasing partners (perhaps neighbors, friends, or a spouse) can have intensities of demand that do not match her own.
Simultaneously selected two-part price schedules in a homogeneous-good oligopoly market would not include the features of interest described above; in equilibrium all firms would set F = 0 and p = c. However, in alternative modeling frameworks, positive fixed fees and unit prices above cost may be observed. Heywood and Pal (1993) find that the sequential selection of two-part prices in a homogeneous-good duopoly can lead to positive fixed fees and margins on unit sales. There is also a growing literature on nonlinear prices in differentiated-product oligopolies in which the local market power of firms permits some discretion in pricing strategies. See Wilson (1993) or Stole (1995) for examples.
I used a simple model to study pricing and profit under arbitrage with minimal technical distractions. There are several directions in which the analysis can be extended. Among the topics for further study are: (i) a richer model of uncertainty over consumer demand intensities, (ii) an explicit model of consumer interaction, (iii) the introduction of intermediaries or brokers who facilitate cooperation among consumers, and (iv) the description of transaction costs as sensitive to the number of agents interacting and to the efforts of agents to alter these costs. The relevance of the pricing strategies (and profit and welfare results) described here will be strengthened if these strategies also emerge in models that include the extensions listed above.
There are many markets to which I can look for examples of consumer resale or sharing.
Neighbors may make a joint purchase of a lawnmower or snowblower. Sports fans may divide a season ticket among several people. Vacationers who cannot afford holiday homes may join a time-share association. Shoppers may share payment of a sign-up fee to a members-only discount store. New theoretical studies that address the pricing and purchasing phenomena in these markets should attempt to explain why resale or cooperative purchase is sometimes tolerated and sometimes discouraged by firms.
